The article is written by Maciek Kucharczyk, a journalist for Gazeta.pl.
Recordings of the wreck, taken on June 22, 2023, by a robot searching for the submersible that had gone missing four days earlier, were released. Initially, there were hopes of finding the sub intact with its five passengers alive. However, the images recorded by the search robot dispelled any speculation that the passengers could have been saved.
Official Investigation and Released Materials
The recordings were made public by the United States Coast Guard (USCG), which led the search efforts and is now conducting the investigation. The investigation has been given the highest priority, overseen by the Marine Board of Investigation, which handles only the most significant events—typically one in a thousand cases annually reviewed by the USCG. The commission began public hearings on September 16, and they are expected to continue through the end of the month. Various experts and individuals associated with OceanGate, the company that owned the Titan submersible, are providing valuable testimony to the investigators.
The commission ordered the release of the footage of the Titan wreck, along with an animation depicting its final dive and a recording of communication between the submersible and the mothership on the surface. This communication revealed that those aboard the sub did not express any concerns about its condition or report any significant issues. Almost exactly 1.5 hours after the dive began, the crew sent a message about releasing two ballast blocks to slow the descent - this was a routine procedure as the sub approached the seabed. It was at a depth of 3,336 meters, with the Titanic wreck lying at 3,802 meters. Six seconds after this message, the mothership lost contact with the Titan.
The footage taken four days later, which has now been made public, shows the aftermath of the submersible’s fate. A white part of the sub’s stern stands vertically on the seabed. This section was not pressurized, meaning water freely flowed through it. It housed various auxiliary equipment and had been attached to the rear wall of the pressurized hull where the crew was seated. It detached when the catastrophic implosion occurred. The wreckage of the pressurized hull lay nearby in two large sections and many smaller pieces. One main section was the rear hemispherical wall and the crushed remains of the cylindrical middle portion made from carbon fiber. This is where the crew would have been at the time of the disaster. A little farther away lay the detached front hemispherical wall, missing the porthole in its center, which has not been recovered.
The wreckage was later brought to the surface. The remains of all five crew members were found and identified using DNA analysis. Those who perished were Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood (a Pakistani businessman and his son), Hamish Harding (a British businessman), Paul-Henri Nargeolet (a French Titanic wreck expert), and Stockton Rush (the owner of OceanGate and the primary creator of the Titan).
Potential Cause of the Incident Presented
Investigators have not yet presented their conclusions, which will be released within the next 12 months in an official report. However, one of the individuals who testified was Tym Catterson, a former contractor for OceanGate involved in constructing the Titan’s hull. He claimed to have expressed doubts about the strength of the carbon fiber and titanium structure multiple times during the project. "I was pessimistic about it, but I could never get my calculations to match his numbers," he said, referring to his discussions with Rush. "I told him I thought it was underbuilt, and the calculations didn’t add up," he added. Rush reportedly dismissed his concerns, saying, "several other engineers working on it think otherwise." Catterson concluded that they "agreed to disagree."
Catterson also proposed what he believes to be the most likely scenario for the disaster. According to his calculations, the central part of the pressurized hull, which was a carbon fiber tube, did not fail. This had previously been suggested as the probable cause of the accident, attributed to material fatigue after repeated dives, exacerbated by poor construction quality. Instead, Catterson believes that the failure occurred at the junction between the central carbon fiber section and the titanium front rim, to which the bow was attached. This connection was secured with special adhesive and steel fasteners. He argued that the minimal flexing of the carbon fiber hull during each dive exerted repetitive pressure on the joints, weakening them over time. Eventually, the connection failed.
The state of the wreckage supports this theory. The front wall was found detached from the rest of the sub without any carbon fiber fragments attached. According to Catterson, this indicates that the failure occurred simultaneously across the entire joint.
The front was cleanly severed. It must have happened very suddenly, meaning the people inside likely had no idea what was happening
- the engineer explained. The unsupported central section immediately imploded, partially crushing into the rear wall under the force of the water.
The Tyrant Who Brought About His Own Death
Other former employees and collaborators of OceanGate also testified before the commission. Their statements centered on what has been known since the early stages of the investigation—namely, the character of Stockton Rush, who was described as despotic and dismissive of established safety standards, seeing them as unnecessary barriers to innovation. According to the testimonies, Rush routinely ignored or rejected concerns, preferring the opinions of engineers who agreed with him. He was able to operate this way because he used his submersible in international waters, where no state laws or safety regulations applied - aside from common sense.
Tony Nissen, the chief engineer at OceanGate from 2016 to 2019, testified that he was fired for refusing to approve Titan's first mission due to safety concerns. He recounted numerous private arguments with Rush, where they disagreed vehemently over the project’s safety. "He fought fiercely for what he wanted and was unwilling to compromise on anything—not even a millimeter," Nissen said.
Bonnie Carl, former HR manager and potential Titan pilot, also testified. She described seeing young engineers, some barely in their 20s and with little experience, working unsupervised on the sub. "It concerned me because I knew I didn’t know what I was doing," she said. Carl left the company shortly after a 2018 meeting where David Lochridge, the head of marine exploration, presented a report containing a series of safety concerns and recommendations. Lochridge was subsequently fired by Rush. "It became clear to me that OceanGate wasn’t a place I wanted to work if that was their approach to safety," Carl stated.
